Beyond \u3ci\u3eBeyond Conjugality\u3c/i\u3e by Cossman, Brenda & Ryder, Bruce
Canadian Journal of Family Law 
Volume 30 Number 2 
2017 
Beyond Beyond Conjugality 
Brenda Cossman 
Bruce Ryder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/can-j-fam-l 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder, "Beyond Beyond Conjugality" (2017) 30:2 Can J Fam L 227. 
The University of British Columbia (UBC) grants you a license to use this article under the Creative Commons 
Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. If you wish to use this 
article or excerpts of the article for other purposes such as commercial republication, contact UBC via the 
Canadian Journal of Family Law at cdnjfl@interchange.ubc.ca 
 
 
BEYOND BEYOND CONJUGALITY 
 
Brenda Cossman* and Bruce Ryder** 
 
 
FIFTEEN YEARS BEYOND BEYOND CONJUGALITY 
 
In 2001, the Law Commission of Canada (LCC) released its 
report Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close 
Adult Relationships.1  In the report, the LCC sought to rethink 
the ways in which conjugality has been used by legislatures and 
governments as a proxy for the recognition of adult personal 
relationships and the legal distribution of rights and 
responsibilities. Conjugality, it argued, was a poor proxy for the 
relational attributes relevant to legislative objectives. The LCC 
argued that the law should more carefully tailor its definitions of 
adult personal relationships to the underlying objectives of state 
regulation.  
 
The Beyond Conjugality report has been extensively 
debated and cited since its release. Even though it is too early, 
from the Law Commission’s long-term perspective, to come up 
with a final assessment of the contributions made by the Beyond 
Conjugality report, this paper assesses the report’s impact on 
scholarly and political debates thus far. We consider whether the 
assumptions and methodology underlying the report remain 
                                                          
*  Brenda Cossman is Professor of Law and the Director of the Bonham 
Centre for Sexual Diversity Studies at the University of Toronto. 
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1  Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and 
Supporting Close Adult Relationships (Ottawa: Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 2001) [Beyond Conjugality]. 
Canadian Journal of Family Law [Vol. 30(2), 2017] 
 
228 
valuable. By stopping short of recommending that the state cease 
to regulate marriage altogether, and by not recommending the 
repeal of conjugal offences such as polygamy, did the report not 
go far enough? With the benefits of hindsight, would we urge 
the Commission to write the report differently now? To what 
extent did the recognition of same sex marriage in Canada in 
2005 close down any further reconsideration of adult personal 
relationships? Is the model of conjugality that the report 
criticized more entrenched today? Should the Commission have 
written the report differently to give further political and legal 
resonance to alternatives to conjugality? Specifically, how might 
the report have better addressed the question of the dyadic 
couple versus multiple party relationships?  
 
I – THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
OF BEYOND CONJUGALITY 
 
In Beyond Conjugality, the LCC sought to rethink the ways in 
which conjugality has been used by legislatures and 
governments as a proxy for the recognition of adult personal 
relationships and the distribution of rights and responsibilities. 
Conjugality, it argued, was a poor proxy for the relational 
attributes relevant to legislative objectives. The LCC argued that 
the law should more carefully tailor its definitions of adult 
personal relationships to the underlying objectives of state 
regulation. For any existing or proposed law that employs 
relational terms to accomplish its objectives, it proposed a four-
part methodology for considering the relevance and regulation 
of relationships. First, government should consider whether the 
objective of the particular law is legitimate. Second, if the law’s 
objective is sound, the government should consider whether 
relationships are actually relevant. Third, government should 
expand the options to allow people to determine status for 
themselves through various self-designation mechanisms, 
including an expansion of registration options and marriage to 
same-sex couples. Fourth, when government imposition or 
ascription of relationship status is appropriate (because 
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relationships do matter, and self-designation is not feasible), 
then the operative definitions of the relevant relationships need 
to be revised.2  
 
This tiered methodology aimed to create momentum 
towards more careful thinking about legislative reliance on 
relationships. Where relationships are relevant, the report sought 
to put the power to determine which relationships are most 
important in individuals’ hands. When that is not feasible, the 
report encouraged governments and legislatures to rethink the 
functional definitions they use to ascribe relational status so that 
the focus is on relevant criteria. In particular, the report focused 
on emotional intimacy and economic interdependence as two 
functional relational attributes important across a number of 
contexts. The report’s language also suggested that shared 
residence should be a third potentially relevant functional 
attribute in some circumstances. Instead of focusing on whether 
individuals were living in spousal  or conjugal  relationships, 
it proposed a focus on whether they were living in relationships 
characterized by emotional and economic interdependence. 3 
While the Commission ultimately recommended that a range of 
definitions need to be carefully tailored to particular statutory 
contexts, the themes of economic and emotional intimacy ran 
through the solutions that the report proposed.  
 
 At the time of the LCC’s work on the Beyond 
Conjugality report, the struggle to achieve legal recognition of 
same-sex marriage in Canada was at an intense stage. Gay and 
lesbian couples were on the brink of a wave of litigation success 
across the country.4 The Commission was firmly of the view that 
                                                          
2  Ibid at 29 30. 
3  Ibid at 114. 
4  See onald  asswell  o ing oward Sa e-Se  arriage  1  
8  an ar Re  81  ruce ac ougall  he ele ration of Sa e-
Se  arriage  (2001) 32:2 Ottawa L Rev 235. 
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the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry was 
discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the 
logic of the equality rights in section 15 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms led inexorably to that conclusion, even 
though it had been resisted by the courts up to that point. As the 
LCC put it in the Beyond Conjugality report, the capacity to 
form conjugal relationships characterized by emotional and 
economic interdependence has nothing to do with sexual 
orientation. 5 Therefore, [i]f governments are to continue to 
maintain an institution called marriage, they cannot do so in a 
discriminatory fashion. 6  
 
 In the years immediately following the release of 
Beyond Conjugality, a series of courts reached the same 
conclusion, culminating in appeal court rulings legalizing same-
sex marriage in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec.7 Faced 
with this speedy emergence of a new judicial consensus about 
the appropriate legal bounds of conjugal coupledom, the federal 
government abandoned any further appeals. Shortly thereafter, 
the government unveiled the Civil Marriage Act. After receiving 
                                                          
5  Supra note 1 at 130. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Hendricks c Québec (Procureure générale), [2004] RJQ 851, 238 DLR 
(4th) 577 (CA); EGALE Canada Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 
2003 BCCA 251, 225 DLR (4th) 472; Halpern v Canada (Attorney 
General) (2003), 65 OR (3d) 161, 225 DLR (4th) 529 (CA). See also 
Dunbar & Edge v Yukon (Government of) & Canada (AG), 2004 
YKSC 54, 8 RFL (6th) 235; NW v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 
SKQB 434, 11 RFL (6th) 162. For accounts of the litigation story, see 
ohn isher  Outlaws or n-laws: Successes and Challenges in the 
Struggle for L  uality   9  McGill LJ 1183; Robert 
inte ute  Se ual Orientation and the harter  he chie e ent of 
Formal Legal Equality (1985  and ts Li its   9  
McGill LJ 1143. 
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a seal of approval from the Supreme Court of Canada,8 the Act 
was adopted by Parliament in 2005.9 The central provision of the 
Act redefined civil marriage for the nation as a whole as the 
lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others. 10 
 
While the LCC had no doubts about adding its voice in 
2001 to the condemnation of the exclusion of gay and lesbians 
from the right to marry, this was not its priority for the Beyond 
Conjugality report. Indeed, we think it is fair to say the LCC was 
frustrated by the failure of opponents and proponents of same-
sex marriage to engage with the larger issues. The LCC’s 
priority in the Beyond Conjugality project was to move beyond 
and unsettle the parameters of the equal marriage debate by 
interrogating the state’s role in recognizing and supporting adult 
personal relationships more generally. The timing of Beyond 
Conjugality was not accidental. The LCC aimed to take 
advantage of the discursive space opened up by the struggle for 
same-sex marriage to interrogate the legal relevance of 
conjugality to contemporary state objectives.  
 
The boundaries of who was included in coupled 
conjugality had been shifting for some time and were about to 
shift even more dramatically. Largely submerged in the public 
and legal debates about the boundaries of coupled conjugality 
was any sustained critical interrogation of the legal content and 
consequences of conjugality. The LCC assumed that conjugality 
had to be defined without discrimination on the basis of marital 
status or sexual orientation; the more urgent project, from the 
point of view of its mandate, was to bring a critical reassessment 
of the uses of conjugality as a legal category to the fore. This 
choice is evident in the structure of the LCC’s report: the issue 
of same-sex marriage is deferred until the last section of the 
                                                          
8  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698. 
9  SC 2005, c 33. 
10  Ibid, s 2. 
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report, and received only two pages of discussion. 11  Some 
advocates of same-sex marriage were unhappy with the LCC’s 
approach. Strategically, they thought it wisest to defer a critical 
conversation about conjugality until after the achievement of 
same-sex marriage. And they were suspicious of the LCC’s 
attempt to promote a fundamental reconsideration of marriage’s 
legal design at the precise moment that gay and lesbian couples 
were on the threshold of inclusion.  
 
II – POLITICAL AFTERMATH OF BEYOND 
CONJUGALITY 
 
The Law Commission of Canada Act 12  grants the LCC an 
expansive mandate, one that seeks to address fundamental 
questions rather than more narrow or technical issues of law 
reform. The role of the LCC set out in the statute is to keep the 
law and its effects under systematic review  in order to provide 
independent advice on improvements, modernization and 
reform that will ensure a just legal system that meets the 
changing needs of Canadian society .13 The preamble provides 
that the commission should adopt a multidisciplinary approach 
to its work that views the law and the legal system in a broad 
social and economic context .14 
 
We had the privilege of working with the LCC for 
several years on its work that culminated in the Beyond 
Conjugality report. We wrote a background paper for the 
commission in 2000, and we were hired by the commission to 
continue working on the preparation of the final report in 2000 
and 2001. The LCC’s research process consisted of a 
                                                          
11 Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 129 31. 
12  SC 1996, c 9 [LCC Act]. 
13  Ibid, s 3. 
14  Ibid, Preamble, para 4. 
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preliminary identification of issues related to its broader 
research focus on personal relationships, drawing on a series of 
background papers prepared by scholars in law and other 
disciplines.15 The commission’s initial consultations led to the 
release of a discussion paper in May 2000 that set out broad 
questions about the policy objectives, principles, and legal 
modalities that should guide the regulation of close personal 
                                                          
15  Many of the impressive array of background papers prepared for the 
L ’s Beyond Conjugality report are available at the Government of 
Canada Publications website, online: <www.publications.gc.ca>. They 
include Law Commission of Canada, Spousal Testimony in Criminal 
Cases, by Allan Manson (Ottawa: LCC, August 2001); Law 
Commission of Canada, Registered Partnerships: A Model for 
Relationship Recognition, by Nicole LaViolette (Ottawa: LCC, August 
2001); Law Commission of Canada, Compensation for Relational 
Harm, by Shauna Van Praagh (Ottawa: LCC, July 2001); Law 
Commission of Canada, The Evolution and Diversity of Relationships 
in Canadian Families, by Teresa Janz (Ottawa: LCC, September 
2000); Commission du droit du Canada, Le contrat en contexte 
d’intimité, by A Roy (Ottawa: Commission du droit du Canada, June 
2001); Law Commission of Canada, The Legal Regulation of Adult 
Personal Relationships: Evaluating Policy Objectives and Legal 
Options in Federal Legislation, by B Cossman & B Ryder (Ottawa: 
LCC, May 2000); Law Commission of Canada, Personal 
Relationships of Support Between Adults: The Case of Disability, by 
Roeher Institute (Ottawa: LCC, March 2001); Law Commission of 
Canada, Close Personal Relationships between Adults: 100 Years of 
Marriage in Canada, by K Arnup (Ottawa: LCC, March 2001); Law 
Commission of Canada, The Benefit/Penalty Unit in Income Tax 
Policy: Diversity and Reform, by K Lahey (Ottawa: LCC, September 
2000); Law Commission of Canada, Division of Powers and 
Jurisdictional Issues Relating to Marriage, by J Fisher, K Lahey & L 
Arron, EGALE (Ottawa: LCC, June 2000); Law Commission of 
Canada, What’s Sex Got to Do with It? Tax and the “Family”, by C 
Young (Ottawa: LCC, May 2000). A full list of the background 
research papers that informed the report is included in Beyond 
Conjugality, supra note 1 at 148 50. 
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relationships between adults.16 The first two presidents of the 
LCC, Roderick Macdonald (who served in this capacity from 
1997 2000) and Nathalie Des Rosiers (2000 2004), were 
instrumental in shaping the expansive vision that animated the 
commission’s investigations into the legal regulation of adult 
personal relationships. Under their leadership, the LCC engaged 
a multidisciplinary study panel of researchers with a 
commitment to tailoring the law’s objectives and reach to 
measurable social conditions. 17  The LCC’s work was also 
guided by its commissioners, a citizens’ Advisory Council,18 
and extensive public consultations. 19  When the commission 
identified gaps in its research, or other flaws in its draft reports, 
it would seek additional input from scholars and other advisers. 
The collaborative and collective nature of the commission’s 
work, drawing upon and constantly informed by a wide range of 
interdisciplinary expertise, was impressive and made working 
with the commission a particularly enlightening and rewarding 
experience. 
 
When we worked with the LCC on researching and 
drafting the Beyond Conjugality report, we were instructed not 
to concern ourselves with short-term acceptability of the report’s 
analysis and recommendations. The LCC emphasized that its 
goal was to issue a report that explored fundamental questions 
in an innovative manner, would stand the test of time, and might 
be influential a few generations down the road. The impressive 
and growing body of scholarship in Canada and abroad engaging 
                                                          
16  Law Commission of Canada, Recognizing and Supporting Close 
Personal Relationships Between Adults: Discussion Paper (Ottawa: 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, May 2000).  
17  Study panels were authorized by the LCC Act, supra note 12, s 20. 
18  Ibid, ss 7, 18. 
19  or further discussion of the L ’s a roach to its wor  see Nathalie 
es Rosiers  n e oria  La o ission du roit du anada  he 
Law Commission of Canada, 1997  7   LS 1 . 
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with the principles and methodology of the Beyond Conjugality 
report suggests that it is contributing to debates in the manner 
the LCC sought.20  
                                                          
20  See e.g. Elizabeth Brake, Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality 
and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Elizabeth 
ra e  Recogni ing are  he ase for riendshi  and Polya ory  
(2014) 1:1 Syracuse L & Civic Engagement Forum, online: 
<slace.syr.edu>; Elizabeth Brake, ed, After Marriage: Rethinking 
Marital Relationships (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Jamie 
R ood  o ing eyond the edroo s of our ation  Redefining 
Canadian Families from the Perspective of Non-Conjugal Caregiving  
8  1  eal 7  ngela a ell   o   ill  1  7   
L Re  7  Susan  ru ond  Polyga y’s nscruta le ri inal 
ischief  9  7  Osgoode Hall L  17  egan aucher  One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Relationship Recognition in Canadian 
Law Post-Same-Sex- arriage  1   tlantis 1  egan 
Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family: The (Re-) Production of Conjugal 
Citizens Through Canadian Immigration Policy and Practice (PhD 
hesis  ueen’s ni ersity e art ent of Political Studies  2013) 
[forthcoming]; aroline  ho as  he Roles of Registered 
Partnershi s and onjugality in anadian a ily Law    
Can J Fam L 223; eyond Sa e-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic 
ision for ll Our a ilies and Relationshi s  uly 1   8  
9  Studies in ender  Se uality 1 1  ancy  Poli off  nding 
arriage s e now t   1 Hofstra L Re  1  ancy  
Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All Families 
under the Law (Boston: Beacon Press, 2008) [Polikoff, Beyond 
(Straight and Gay) Marriage  than  Lie  riendshi  and the Law  
(2007) 54:3 UCLA L Rev 631; Heather Brook, Conjugality: Marriage 
and Marriage-like Relationships Before the Law (New York: Palgrave 
ac illan  7  icola ar er  Se  and the i il Partnershi  ct  
he uture of on onjugality   1  e  Legal Stud 1  
Nicola Barker, Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-
Sex Marriage (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Nicola J 
ar er  Rethin ing onjugality as the asis for a ily Recognition  
A Feminist Rewriting of the Judgment in Burden v. United Kingdom  
(2016) 6:6 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1 9  lsje onthuys   
Patchwork of Marriages: The Legal Relevance of Marriage in a Plural 
Legal Syste  1   O ati Socio-Legal Series 1303; Aeyal 
Canadian Journal of Family Law [Vol. 30(2), 2017] 
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Notwithstanding its admirable research process, 
important and original contributions to scholarship, and 
principled commitment to its statutory mandate, the LCC paid a 
high political price for its critical assessment of the legal value 
of conjugality as a category of regulation. Stinging from the 
removal of the legal barrier to same-sex marriage, in 2006 the 
newly-elected Conservative government cancelled funding to 
the Court Challenges Program (which supported litigation 
invoking constitutional equality or language rights). At the same 
time, the government cut all funding to the LCC, forcing it to 
shut down its operations even though the government did not 
introduce a bill to repeal the LCC’s constituent statute.21 The 
LCC still exists, at least in the statute book, which sustains hope 
that it might rise again from the ashes.22 
                                                          
ross  he urden of onjugality  in  re s ed  Diversity and 
European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 265; Amanda Head, 
he Legal Recognition of lose Personal Relationshi s in ew South 
Wales  ase for Refor  11  1 1 linders L   argaret 
riggs  Rethin ing Relationshi s  1   LR 9  Melina 
Constantine Bell, ender ssentialis  and erican Law  hy and 
How to Se er the onnection  (2016) 23:2 Duke J Gender L & Pol’y 
163. 
21  LCC Act, supra note 12. Members of the House of Commons objected 
to the closure through funding cuts of the LCC and characterized the 
go ern ent’s failure to introduce a ending legislation as conte t of 
the House of o ons. S ea er Peter illi en ruled that he cannot 
conclude that the go ern ent’s action on the Law o ission is 
flouting the authority of the House. While members may have deep 
concerns about the decision to no longer fund the Law Commission of 
Canada  this decision does not constitute a reach of ri ilege.  House 
of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 65 (19 October 2006) at 
4105. 
22  For a typically engaging and thoughtful description of the life and 
times of the Law Commission, including an assessment of whether it 
should e resurrected  see Roderic   acdonald  a ais deu  sans 
trois . Once Refor  wice o ission  hrice Law  07) 22:2 




In his appearance before the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in 2006, then 
Justice Minister Vic Toews said cutting the LCC’s entire budget 
was simply an efficiency measure undertaken to save 3.2 million 
dollars of taxpayers’ money. The elimination of funding was 
justified, he said, because there was nothing the Law 
Commission of Canada did that was particularly unique or that 
could not and was not being carried out by other institutions. 23 
He characterized the LCC as simply . . . an administrative 
mechanism to hire individuals to do research. 24 Conservative 
supporters of the cancellation of funding frequently cited the 
LCC’s temerity in questioning the state’s role in relation to 
                                                          
LS 117. See also Roderic   acdonald  Reco issioning Law 
Refor  1997   lta L Re  8 1 at 87 7  the edagogic and 
therapeutic roles of law reform are precisely to challenge the manner 
in which a problem is presented . . . Law reform is about asking better 
questions. . . . [b]reaking free of posited sources of law and enacted 
doctrinal categories is a key task for any recommissioned law reform 
agency.  
23  Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, 
No 29 (6 November 2006) at 1. 
24  Ibid at 3. The Canadian Bar Association opposed the cancellation of 
funding to the LCC and particularly objected to the suggestion that it 
could fill the role layed y the L  e were fran ly sur rised to 
hear some Ministers suggest that the  could fill the L ’s  role . 
. . The CBA is not primarily a legal research body. There is an 
important need for an independent legal research body that can 
undertake broad-based research and advise on emerging legal policy 
issues. It is simply unrealistic to expect this work to be done by an 
organization with a different mandate and no funds for the task . . . The 
Law Commission of Canada has made a valuable contribution to 
anada’s current dialogue on such issues as legal recognition of adults’ 
personal relationships, how to redress the abuse of children in 
anadian institutions  and the future of olicing in anada.   Par er 
MacCarthy, QC to Art Hanger, Chair, Standing Committee on Justice 
and Human Rights, 2 November 2006. 
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marriage as reason enough for shutting it down. The Beyond 
Conjugality report featured highly in their critique before and 
after the government’s cuts were announced. 25  Indeed, 
supporters of legal marriage as the privileged and exclusive 
domain of opposite-sex couples have frequently decried what 
they see as the radical potential of the report.26 
 
The LCC’s resistance in its work on Beyond Conjugality 
to short-term political pressures, its focus on seeking to 
                                                          
25  Iain Benson said the re ort was not well done  ecause it failed to 
ade uately address the role of the state in relation to arriage  Ibid 
at 21. Senator Anne Cools referred to Beyond Conjugality as a 
scandalous re ort  not worth the a er it’s written on  ar  bey, 
Sy osiu  nited on arriage  The [Montreal] Gazette (24 March 
. n a ress release su orting the cancellation of the L ’s 
funding, REAL Women singled out Beyond Conjugality as an example 
of the failings of the L  ecause it not only reco ended that sa e-
sex marriage be legalized but also recommended that marriage be 
eli inated altogether  R L o en of anada  onser ati e 
Government Cuts Left- ing gencies  ewsletter, REALity 
(November 2006) online: <www.realwomenofcanada.ca>. John 
Carpay, the executive director of the Canadian Constitution 
Foundation at the time, described what he saw as the controversial 
nature of the Law o ission’s wor  in his testi ony  including the 
recommendations in the Beyond Conjugality report. At the same time, 
he insisted that e erything that the Law o ission is ro iding is 
already done elsewhere  Standing Committee on Justice and Human 
Rights, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 28 (1 November 2006) at 5. 
26  ane dol he  he Princi les and anada’s eyond onjugality’ 
Re ort  he o e oward olition of State arriage Laws  in Ro in 
Fretwell Wilson, ed, Reconceiving the Family: Critique on the 
me i an aw Instit te’s in i les o  the aw o  Family Dissolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 351; Daniel Cere & 
Douglas Farrow, eds, Divorcing Marriage: Unveiling the Dangers in 
anada’s ew So ial x e iment (Montreal: McGill- ueen’s 
University Press, 2004); Stanley urt  eyond ay arriage  he 
Road to Polya ory   The Weekly Standard  8:45 (4 August 2003), 
online: <www.weeklystandard.com/article/4186>. 
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contribute to reframing questions and reshaping discourse over 
the long term, the breadth of its consultations and 
interdisciplinary research in other words, its integrity and 
fidelity to its constitutive legislation were precisely the 
features of its work that spelled its doom when a Conservative 
government with a strikingly neo-liberal, managerial, and anti-
intellectual approach to governance was elected in 2006.27 
                                                          
27  As Liberal Member of Parliament Derek Lee commented in the House 
of Commons when the government cut funding to the Court Challenges 
Program and the LCC,  
 I recall the report from the Law Commission entitled 
Beyond Conjugality’. It was a discussion of the law 
relating to spousal and non-spousal relationships. Part of 
the discussion dealt with many of the same-sex marriage 
issues which this House has dealt with. I could not help 
but detect some disfavour on the part of many 
Conservative members about it. I have seen it at the 
justice committee. It is not always on the record, but it is 
there. The court challenges program brings court charter 
challenges into the courts. Members will recall the same 
sex marriage issue, the redevelopment of the definition of 
civil marriage, was accomplished primarily as a result of 
litigation charter challenge. I am not certain whether the 
court challenges program funded any of that; it may have, 
but it is passing strange. I see a connection there. I 
entioned the Law o ission’s re ort and now the 
judges who made these decisions that essentially required 
Parliament to act a year or two ago. I have simply had no 
choice ut to draw the inference that the onser ati es’ 
distaste for those decisions was a prime motivator in this, 
because I cannot see any economic or fiscal reason to turn 
attention to these very viable working mechanisms in our 
judicial sector. The Law Commission which is being 
scrapped now was the reincarnation of the old Law 
Reform Commission, which was scrapped by the 
previous Conservative government in 1990 or 1991. A 
very strange thing. The Conservatives do not like law 
refor  co issions. hey jun  the . : 
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For those troubled by any disruption of the legal 
boundaries of conjugality or of its legal uses, the report amounts 
to a radical rethinking of marriage. Ironically, given the LCC’s 
efforts to situate the same-sex marriage issue as a modest part of 
its broader project of legislative rationalization, its demise was 
fuelled by the heightened anxieties of moral conservatives 
provoked by the arrival of gays and lesbians into the inner 
sanctum of legal marriage.28 But from most other points of view, 
a report aimed at achieving legislative rationality to better 
achieve liberal principles of equality, autonomy, personal 
security, privacy, and efficiency is hardly radical. 
 
III – LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2001 
 
The bulk of the Beyond Conjugality report a section titled 
application  of its methodology29 was directed at a detailed 
analysis of ten federal statutory contexts to illustrate how the 
report’s methodology could lead to reforms that would better 
support the principled accomplishment of the state’s objectives 
of recognizing and supporting adult personal relationships. 
These ten examples were intended to illustrate the benefits of 
following the LCC’s four-step methodology to achieve a more 
comprehensive and systematic approach to law reform. 30 
 
                                                          
 
 House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 80 (9 November 
2006) at 4945. 
28  The expression and management of anxieties produced by the 
reconstitution of legal borders, and the processes of becoming and 
unbecoming sexual citizens, is explored in Brenda Cossman, Sexual 
Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). See especially chapter 4, 
ueer as iti ens  ibid at 159 93). 
29  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 37 111. 
30  Ibid at 37. 
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As far as we know, only one of the recommendations 
directed at the reform of federal statutes in this part of the report 
has been implemented (the repeal of the common law rule that a 
married spouse is not a competent witness for the Crown, 
discussed below). From the LCC’s perspective aiming to shift 
the parameters of debates and reshape the fundamental questions 
over the long term this should not be too discouraging. A lack 
of immediate legislative adoption of its recommendations could 
be seen as much as a sign of success as one of failure.  
 
The only comprehensive and systematic  law reforms 
undertaken by the Parliament of Canada in this area over the past 
few decades have been those aimed at the ongoing project of 
bringing cohabiting opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples 
within the conjugal space previously reserved for married 
opposite-sex couples. While the LCC strongly supported these 
trajectories toward a non-discriminatory conception of 
conjugality, it was more focused on decentring conjugality from 
legal regulation. In this sense, from a federal legislative 
perspective, the aftermath of the Beyond Conjugality report has 
been precisely what it feared and the opposite of what it sought 
to achieve: the legal definition of coupled conjugality has been 
extended to the previously excluded and as a result has become 
more deeply entrenched at the heart of the state’s approach to 
relationship recognition and support.31 
                                                          
31  Human rights discourse has played a significant role in directing and 
limiting legislative reform of the coupled conjugal regime. Prohibitions 
on sexual orientation and marital status discrimination have been 
enlisted effectively by same-sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex 
couples respectively to achieve inclusion. Non-conjugal cohabitants 
and those living in plural conjugal relationships have not yet had the 
same kind of success invoking prohibitions on discrimination or other 
human rights to challenge their exclusion from legal rights or benefits. 
Their relative absence from relationship regulation rules is mirrored by 
a similar absence from human rights law so far. See, for example, the 
rejection of the challenge brought by two cohabiting sisters to 
inheritance tax laws in Burden v The United Kingdom, No 13378/05, 
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Indeed, the conservative anxieties provoked by the 
achievement of equal coupled conjugality led the federal 
government headed by Prime Minister Harper to focus on 
finding new barbarians at the gates, and on shoring up or at 
least creating the perception of shoring up the remaining 
borders of entry to conjugality based on age, voluntary and 
informed consent, and dyadic or coupled relationships. Thus, to 
                                                          
[2008] III ECHR 357, 47 EHRR 38 [GC]. For similar stories in 
anada  see assie illia s  o a Scotia Sisters ho’ e Li ed 
ogether 8 ears ant Sur i or enefits  CBC News (28 October 
2016), online: <www.cbc.ca>. See also the comments of cohabiting 
twin sisters included in Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 119. On 
the rights of polya orists  see lison rawford  anadian 
Polya orists ace ni ue Legal hallenges  Research Re eals  CBC 
News 1  Se te er 1   he urrent  Polya orous a ilies 
ant anadian Law to atch u  with heir Relationshi s  1  
September 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-
for-september-16-2016-1.3765094> at 00h:25m:12s; John-Paul E 
oyd  Polya orous Relationshi s and a ily Law in anada  ril 
2017), online Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family 
<www.crilf.ca>; and the arguments made by the Canadian Polyamory 
Advocacy Association (CPAA) in the polygamy reference: Reference 
re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, 
[2012] 5 WWR 477 [Polygamy Reference]. The submissions of the 
parties and intervenors are collected online: CPAA 
<www.polyadvocacy.ca>. While the majority opinion of the U.S. 
Supreme Court finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage 
limited its ruling to couples, Chief Justice Roberts in dissent noted that 
the ajority’s logic e tended to lural relationshi s  One immediate 
uestion in ited y the ajority’s osition is whether States may retain 
the definition of marriage as a union of two people. . . . Although the 
ajority rando ly inserts the adjecti e two  in arious places, it 
offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core 
definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman 
ele ent ay not. . . . t is stri ing how uch of the ajority’s 
reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental 
right to lural arriage.  Obergefell v Hodges, Roberts J. Dissenting, 
192 L Ed 2d 609, 135 S Ct 2584 (2015) at 20. 
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ward off the new threats to conjugality apparently posed by child 
marriage, forced marriage, and plural marriage, and to position 
them clearly as uncivilized and unenlightened practices of 
cultural outsiders, in 2015 Parliament passed the Zero Tolerance 
for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act. 32  It amended the Civil 
Marriage Act by adding these provisions:  
 
2.1 Marriage requires the free and enlightened consent 
of two persons to be the spouse of each other. 
 
2.2 No person who is under the age of 16 years may 
contract marriage. 
 
2.3 No person may contract a new marriage until every 
previous marriage has been dissolved by death or by 
divorce or declared null by a court order.  
 
 A further example of the federal government’s lack of 
interest in displacing conjugality from the heart of legal 
regulation of relationships are the 2015 amendments to the 
evidentiary rules regarding spousal competence and 
compellability, and to the marital communications privilege.33 
The LCC recommended the repeal of the common law rule of 
spousal incompetence on the grounds that the rationale for the 
rule a spouse’s testimonial choices should not be allowed to 
put his or her marriage at risk is inconsistent with values of 
equality and autonomy and therefore no longer legitimate.34 As 
for the rule that a spouse is not a compellable witness, and the 
marital communications privilege, the LCC recommended that 
these rules should be more flexible and should extend to a wide 
                                                          
32  SC 2015, c 29, s 4. 
33  Victims Bill of Rights Act, SC 2015, c 13, ss 52 53. 
34  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 50. 
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range of close personal relationships.35  In the Commission’s 
view, judges should have discretion, in the particular 
circumstances of a case, to decide whether the harm caused to 
the witness or to the relationship by having to testify or disclose 
communications outweighs the desirability of admitting the 
testimony.36 
 
Judges have frequently criticized the incoherence of the 
existing spousal testamentary rules and noted the need for 
Parliament to revise them.37 Some courts have found that the 
prohibition on marital status discrimination in the Charter 
requires that the marital communications privilege be extended 
to unmarried conjugal cohabitants.38 Courts divided on whether 
the now-repealed rule regarding spousal non-compellability was 
constitutionally sound: some found it discriminatory and 
extended it to unmarried cohabitants;39 others found the special 
treatment given to married spouses to be justifiable under section 
1 of the Charter.40 
 
                                                          
35  Ibid at 55. 
36  Ibid. 
37  See e.g. R v Salituro, [1991] 3 SCR 654, 8 CRR (2d) 173; R v Hawkins, 
[1996] 3 SCR 1043, 141 DLR (4th) 193; R v Couture, 2007 SCC 28, 
[2007] 2 SCR 517; R v Masterson (2009), 194 CRR (2d) 165, 245 CCC 
(3d) 400 (ONSC) [Masterson]. 
38  See e.g. Masterson, supra note 37; R v Hall, 2013 ONSC 834, 114 OR 
d  9  aff’d on other grounds  1  O  1  1 8 OR d  1 
[Hall]; R v Nero  1  O S  189   RR d   re ’d in art  
2016 ONCA 160, 351 CRR (2d) 143 [Nero]. 
39  R v Legge, 2014 ABCA 213, [2014] 9 WWR 260. 
40  R v Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278, 125 OR (3d) 321; R v Martin, 2009 
SKCA 37, [2009] 5 WWR 16. See also R v Nuttall, 2015 BCSC 943, 
[2015] B.C.W.L.D. 5765 (common law marital defence to conspiracy 
should not be extended to unmarried conjugal couples). 
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Rather than enter into the complications of defining the 
relevant close relationships, and balancing the goal of supporting 
those relationships with the state interest in prosecuting crime, 
Parliament chose a blunter approach. It used the Victims Bill of 
Rights Act to repeal the rule of spousal non-compellability and 
show that its commitment to facilitating prosecutions and 
supporting victims of crime outstrips its commitment to 
supporting marriage (or at least the marriages of those accused 
of crime). While married spouses are now competent and 
compellable witnesses against their spouses at the behest of the 
prosecution, Parliament left the marital communications 
privilege in section 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act41 intact, 
despite the findings of the LCC42 and some courts43 that it is 
under inclusive because it promotes trust and candour only in 
marital relationships, and thus discriminates on the basis of 
marital status. 
 
While the comprehensive approach to federal law 
reform set out in the Beyond Conjugality report has thus far had 
little concrete success, one can discern some glimmers of its 
recommended attention to the rights of non-conjugal cohabitants 
by provincial legislatures. 44  Most provinces, like the federal 
Parliament, have enacted legislation to remove barriers to the 
equal treatment of conjugal couples,45 but have not pursued law 
reforms to include non-conjugal cohabitants. Alberta notably 
                                                          
41  RSC 1985, c C-5. 
42  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 52 53. 
43  Masterson, supra note 37; Hall, supra note 38; Nero, supra note 38. 
44  The same is true with regard to expanding legal conceptions of parental 
status and parent-child relationshi s. See i  roo s  a eos fro  
the argins of onjugality  in Ro ert Lec ey ed, After Legal Equality: 
Family, Sex, Kinship (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015) 99. 
45  See e.g. An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision in M. v. H., SO 1999, c 6. 
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took a step towards the recognition of the rights of non-conjugal 
cohabitants in 2002 with the passage of the Adult Interdependent 
Relationships Act. 46  The Act defines adult independent 
partners  (AIP) as two people who have entered into an AIP 
agreement, or, if they are not related to each other by blood or 
adoption, have lived together in a relationship of 
interdependence  for three years, or have a child through birth 
or adoption.47 A relationship of interdependence  is defined as 
one in which any two persons share one another’s lives , are 
emotionally committed to each other , and function as an 
economic and domestic unit .48  To assist judges in deciding 
when two people are functioning as the required economic and 
domestic unit , the legislation provides a list of relevant factors, 
such as the degree of emotional and economic support they 
provide each other, the degree of exclusivity of the relationship, 
and the degree they hold themselves out to the public as a unit.49 
The existence of a conjugal element to the relationship which 
presumably means whether they have sex is but one factor 
listed.50  
 
The passage of the Alberta legislation was motivated by 
the desire to preserve marriage and spousal status exclusively as 
the domain of opposite-sex couples, safe from gay and lesbian 
invaders.51 Hence, the new status of AIPs: if two people are 
                                                          
46  SA 2002, c A-4.5. 
47  Ibid, s 3(1). 
48  Ibid, s 1(1)(f). 
49  Ibid, s 1(2). 
50  Ibid, s 1(2)(a). 
51  Lisa lennon  is lacing the onjugal a ily’ in Legal Policy A 
Progressi e o e  (2005) 17:2 Child & Fam LQ 141 at 160 (Glennon 
notes that the ct’s ri ary intention was to harter-proof Alberta 
legislation, whilst entrenching the traditional definition of marriage 
and its superiority. . . . although the Act was held out as progressive, in 
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AIPs, they are accorded some of the same rights as married 
spouses in Alberta. 
 
Some scholars have praised the passage of the Alberta 
legislation as an important step forward. For example, Nancy 
Polikoff, in her book urging governments to shift their approach 
to valuing all committed family relationships, wrote that 
Canada will achieve even greater justice for all families if the 
law embraces the principles of the Beyond Conjugality report 
and considers the Alberta Adult Interdependent Relationships 
Act a model from which to build other protections for 
nonconjugal relationships. 52  
  
 Others are not so sure. Lois Harder, for example, is more 
ambivalent. She agrees that the legal recognition of nonconjugal 
relationships poses a radical challenge to the presumed 
naturalness and ensuing privilege of the heteronormative 
married family. She also worries that the recognition of AIPs is 
more consistent with a neo-liberal agenda of privatizing support 
than it is with achieving other goals: policy makers are more 
interested in establishing a social order in which private 
obligations between citizens are reinforced and social outlays 
are reduced than they are in ensuring the autonomy of citizens 
or limiting their vulnerability. 53  
 
Harder’s concerns are supported by a review of the case 
law in Alberta interpreting the Adult Interdependent 
                                                          
reality it was introduced as a smokescreen to avoid the express 
recognition of same-se  cou les. ). 
52  Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage, supra note 20 at 115. 
53  Lois Harder  he State and the riendshi s of the ation  he ase 
of Nonconjugal Relationshi s in the nited States and anada  9  
 Signs  at . See also Lois Harder  Rights of Lo e  he State 
and nti ate Relationshi s in anada and the nited States  7  
14:2 Social Politics: Intl Studies in Gender, State & Society 155. 
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Relationships Act; most of the cases involve claimants seeking 
access to support from an alleged AIP or to dependants’ relief 
under an alleged AIP’s will. 54  It is striking how similar the 
situations of claimants on the borders of conjugality is in this 
context to the account of the lives of claimants in the income tax 
case law compiled by Kim Brooks.55 In one context, claimants 
seek recognition as AIPs to qualify for privatized benefits; in the 
other, they sought exclusion from conjugality to qualify for tax 
credits they would be denied if they had to report the income of 
an alleged common law spouse. In either context, one can see 
that the boundaries between AIP and non-AIP, between conjugal 
and non-conjugal, are elusive, unstable, and shift in peoples’ 
lives. Brooks observes that [m]any people move along the 
spectrum of relationship proximity over the course of their 
relationship , engaging in some practices (like living together or 
having sex) at some points in time but not others. 56  
 
While the recognition of AIPs in Alberta legislation is 
an innovative development on the books, it may be that it plays 
out in unmarried people’s lives in a way that is essentially 
similar to how the conjugal/non-conjugal divide does. We have 
noted elsewhere that having sex is no longer a requirement for 
recognition as a conjugal cohabitant in Canada.57 As a result, the 
lines between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships are 
                                                          
54  See e.g. Rockey v Hartwell, 2016 ABQB 438, 68 RFL (7th) 395; Re 
Lang Estate, 2016 ABQB 16, 16 ETR (4th) 106; Knight v Wowk, 2015 
ABPC 286; Nelson v Balachandran, 2015 ABCA 155, 6 ETR (4th) 79; 
Re Riley Estate, 2014 ABQB 725, 5 ETR (4th) 46; Re Paull Estate, 
2013 ABQB 709; Re Racz Estate, 2013 ABQB 668, 95 ETR (3d) 214; 
Re Charles Estate, 2013 ABQB 632, 94 ETR (3d) 56; Kostin v Eaket, 
2012 ABQB 756. 
55  Brooks, supra note 44. 
56  Ibid at 112. 
57  Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, hat is arriage-Like Like? The 
rrele ance of onjugality  1  18  Can J Fam L 269 at 294 300. 
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blurring if not dissolving altogether. 58  As the meaning of 
conjugality and non-conjugality are subtly redefined and 
transformed in the application and interpretation of law to the 
murkiness of people’s actual relationships, the law is creeping 
incrementally beyond conjugality as the LCC imagined it.59 
 
IV – BEYOND THE CONJUGAL COUPLE 
 
The LCC’s analysis in Beyond Conjugality was aimed at 
decentring conjugality in legal regulation by encouraging a 
                                                          
58  Ibid at 298 99. 
59  Because the Beyond Conjugality re ort was focused on the law’s 
res onse to close ersonal adult relationshi s  in federal areas of 
jurisdiction, it did not address, and we have not discussed here, law 
reforms related to parental status or parent-child relationships. While 
the law in these areas has also responded to the diversity of family 
forms in halting and uneven ways, there have been important steps 
forward. See e.g. AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2, 83 OR (3d) 561; All 
Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related Registrations Statute 
Law Amendment), 2016, SO 2016, c 23. See also Roxanne Mykitiuk, 
eyond once tion  Legal eter inations of iliation in the onte t 
of ssisted Re roducti e echnologies  1  9  Osgoode Hall L  
771  ngela a ell  oncei ing Parents through Law  7  21:2 
ntl L Pol’y  a   Lois Harder  ichelle ho arat  
Parentage Law in anada  he u ers a e of Standing and 
Status  1  1 ntl L Pol’y  a   iona elly  One of 
These Families Is Not Like the Others: The Legal Response to Non-
Nor ati e ueer Parenting in anada  1  1 1 lta L Re  1  
iona elly  ulti le-Parent a ilies nder ritish olu ia’s ew 
Family Law Act: A Challenge to the Supremacy of the Nuclear Family 
or a Method by which to Preserve Biological Ties and Opposite-Sex 
Parenting  1  7   L Re   Stu ar el  he olution 
of Plural Parentage: Applying Vulnerability Theory to Polygamy and 
Same-Se  arriage  1   ory L  7. or a discussion of 
the links between the struggle for conjugal equality and expanding 
conce tions of arenthood  see ouglas e ai e  arriage uality 
and the ew Parenthood  1  1 9  Har  L Re  118 . 
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range of self-designation mechanisms and, where that is not 
feasible, adopting definitions of the relevant relationships 
tailored to the accomplishment of legislative objectives in 
specific contexts.60 But an important question left lingering over 
much of the discussion and the solutions proposed was whether 
the LCC intended legal regulation to move beyond its focus on 
the dyad or couple.  
 
The logic of the report, fuelled by the principles of 
equality, autonomy, and state neutrality it articulated,61 pointed 
towards the legal recognition and support of interdependent 
relationships of all shapes and sizes. Moreover, many of the 
solutions that the LCC proposed had the potential to apply 
beyond the dyad.62 Still, there were many obvious ways in which 
the report remains shackled within a dyadic concept of marriage, 
conjugality, and even non-conjugality. The discussion of 
marriage in the final chapter of the report epitomized the 
monogamous, dyadic conception of relationships within which 
we were working. While the LCC considered a range of 
controversial options, such as getting the state out of marriage 
altogether, marriage remained defined as monogamous. Indeed, 
the only reference in the report to polygamy was in a footnote 
                                                          
60  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 32 37. 
61  he alue of autono y  the re ort noted  re uires that go ern ents 
put in place the conditions in which people can freely choose their close 
personal relationships. The state must also avoid direct or indirect 
forms of coerci e interference with adults’ freedo  to choose whether 
or not to form, or remain in, close personal relationships. . . . Autonomy 
is compromised if the state provides one relationship status with more 
benefits or legal support than others, or conversely, if the state imposes 
more penalties on one type of relationship than it does on others. . . . 
The state ought to support any and all relationships that have the 
capacity to further relevant social goals, and to remain neutral with 
respect to individuals’ choice of a articular for  or status.  Beyond 
Conjugality, supra note 1 at 18.  
62  See discussion in Part IV(a), below. 
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and it bracketed the question for the future: [i]n this report, the 
Law Commission of Canada does not address the issue of 
polygamy. 63  
 
The report’s discussion of registration regimes was 
somewhat more open-ended. It never stated that registration 
should be limited to couples, but the question was again only 
addressed awkwardly in a footnote: in principle, the Law 
Commission sees no reason to limit registration to two people. 64 
Yet the examples provided three siblings or four 
housemates steered clear of non-dyadic conjugal 
relationships. It is perhaps more than a little ironic that in a report 
intended to think beyond conjugality the LCC was able to allude 
to multiple relationship recognition only in a non-conjugal 
context.  
 
Clearly, the LCC had chosen to avoid the question of 
plural relationships, particularly in a conjugal context. The 
decision was a conscious and politically pragmatic one: the 
report was already controversial and subject to harsh critiques 
from left and right alike. Same-sex marriage remained politically 
divisive and its future far from certain. The allegation from 
moral conservatives of an inevitable slippery slope from same-
sex marriage to polygamy created a real political challenge for 
equal marriage advocates. Moreover, as the reaction to the 
release of the report discussed above made clear, the idea of 
critiquing conjugality itself was provocative. The idea of 
fundamentally rethinking the way government regulated 
relationships the very objective of the report was on the 
cutting edge of the imaginable. The LCC did not believe that it 
                                                          
63  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 134 n 32. After mentioning that a 
previous iteration of the federal law reform commission had 
recommended the repeal of the polygamy offence, the report offered, 
rather ee ly  that it is reasona le to uestion whether use of the 
Criminal Code is the est way to res ond to these issues  ibid).  
64  Ibid at 133, n 16. 
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could throw polygamy or polyamory into this politically 
explosive mix. All of us who worked on the report understood 
that the choice to exclude multiparty adult conjugal relationships 
was an obvious omission. We dodged the issue of poly 
relationships. We would not do so today. 
 
(A) DEFINITIONS OF CLOSE PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Yet, as we return to the report’s four-step methodology and the 
tailored definitions for the recognition of adult personal 
relationships that emerged in the application  section, many 
have the potential to apply to multiple party relationships
whether conjugal or not. Indeed, several of the report’s actual 
recommendations did apply beyond the dyadic couple to 
potentially multiple party relationships, although these were 
largely framed in terms of non-conjugal relationships. Many of 
the report’s suggested solutions could be applied to polyamorous 
spouses provided that they fit the definition of economic and 
emotional interdependence. The LCC did not frame the report in 
this way; it did not give these kinds of examples. But, if we were 
to take a polyamorous relationship, and work the relationship 
through the proposed redefinitions of relevant relationships, 
many would qualify for inclusion in the legal rights or 
obligations at issue.  
 
The four basic questions could and should be applied to 
multiparty relationships. The first two questions is the law 
itself legitimate and are relationships relevant would apply 
equally to dyadic and multiple party relationships. Indeed, the 
number of individuals in a relationship is, we believe, entirely 
irrelevant to these first two questions.  
 
The third question asked whether, instead of having 
government decide in advance which relationships are included, 
it is possible to redesign the law or program to allow individuals 
to designate the relationships that are most important to them 
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and ought to be included. This question regarding the possibility 
of self-designation could be applied to multiple party 
relationships. 
 
 Indeed, the LCC did apply this third question to multiple 
party relationships. Consider for example the LCC’s 
recommendation regarding immigration and family sponsorship. 
The current regime allows individuals to sponsor a relatively 
narrow list of family members as accompanying dependents  
or as within the family class . These included the sponsor’s 
spouse, fiancé(e), dependent children, parents, grandparents, 
siblings, nieces/nephews, grandchildren under the age of 
majority, or one more distant relative if the sponsor does not 
have any close family members in Canada. Instead, the LCC 
recommended that individuals be allowed to decide for 
themselves which relationships are most important to them, 
regardless of marital, conjugal, or blood relationships. 65 
However, the report also recommended that the definition not be 
entirely open-ended. In order to avoid possible abuse of the 
immigration system, by allowing individuals to sponsor virtual 
strangers who would then be able to jump the queue , the report 
suggested two possible approaches. On the first approach, the 
self-designation would be limited to persons who were known 
and emotionally important  to the sponsor.66 Or alternatively, a 
slightly more restrictive option would allow designation of 
persons who have had a close personal relationship 
characterized by emotional or economic interdependence for at 
least one year. 67 
                                                          
65  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 46. 
66  Ibid at 45. The report also suggested a possible limit on the total 
nu er of indi iduals that one could s onsor  t he nu er of ersons 
an individual could sponsor over the course of a lifetime could be 
capped, as suggested by the [Legislative Review] Advisory rou  
(ibid).  
67  Ibid. 




Either of these self-designations would apply beyond 
conjugal and blood relationships. They were intended to allow 
individuals to decide for themselves who is most important to 
them. Moreover, they were never intended to be restricted to the 
dyadic couple: the nature of the immigration sponsorship regime 
is to allow individuals to bring a range of family members.  
Although the definition of spouse was itself restricted at the 
time to opposite-sex couples there is no reason that the new 
definition of individuals who are known and emotionally 
important  or in a close personal relationship  would not apply 
beyond this traditional definition. The report imagined the 
inclusion of same-sex couples within the definition of spouse, as 
well as unmarried couples (at the time of writing in 2001, both 
would be included in the new Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act68 that was about to be passed by Parliament).  
Individuals in multiple party conjugal relationships would 
certainly fall within the definition of known and emotionally 
important  and/or in a close personal relationship . The only 
obstacle to the recognition of multiple party conjugal 
relationships under this definition resides elsewhere: the 
prohibition on polygamy and other plural conjugal unions in 
section 293 of the Criminal Code. If this prohibition were 
removed, there would be no reason that an individual in a 
polygamous or polyamorous relationship would not be able to 
sponsor their partners.   
 
The fourth step of the report’s proposed methodology, 
and some of the tailored definitions it pointed to in the 
application  section, could also be applied to polyamorous 
relationships. At this stage, the report asked if relationships 
matter, and self-designation is not feasible or appropriate, is 
there a better way to include relationships? 69 More specifically, 
                                                          
68  SC 2001, c 27. 
69  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 33. 
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the LCC considered ways to include relationships where 
individuals had not self-designated, or self-designation was not 
feasible, but where inclusion of emotionally or economically 
interdependent relationships was important to the state’s 
interests in recognizing and supporting the full range of 
committed, mutually supportive personal adult relationships. 70 
 
Some of the LCC’s recommendations regarding 
targeted definitions would, we believe, also apply to multiple 
party relationships. Consider for example the LCC’s 
recommendations regarding the Bank Act and the avoidance of 
conflict of interest. The existing definition of related parties  
applied to spouses, common law partners, and minor children. 
Other individuals in a close personal relationship with bank 
officials were not covered by the conflict of interest rules, 
creating a regime that was obviously under-inclusive. The 
Commission recommended that the definition be broadened to 
include individuals in a close personal relationship. 71  The 
definition thereby included individuals in an emotional or 
economically interdependent relationship, beyond marriage, 
conjugality, and blood. It is a definition that we believe would 
and should equally apply to multiple party conjugal 
relationships. Individuals in a polygamous or polyamorous 
relationships would be in an obvious conflict of interest position 
vis-à-vis any of their multiple partners. Once again, the only 
obstacle to their recognition is the law’s prohibition on 
polygamy and polyamory. However, in this instance, excluding 
these multiple spouses rather obviously undermines the law’s 
interest in preventing conflicts of interest.  
 
There are many more recommendations in the report 
regarding a broad range of federal laws. Although the LCC did 
not frame the report in this way, we believe that asking the four 
                                                          
70  Ibid at 34.  
71  Ibid at 62 63.  
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questions and applying the recommendations to polygamous 
and polyamorous relationships would result in their inclusion, 
from a policy perspective. If individuals are living in 
emotionally and economically interdependent relationships, the 
same rationales apply regardless of conjugal, marital, or blood 
relationships. Polygamous and polyamorous spouses largely live 
in these kinds of emotionally and economically interdependent 
relationships, and their exclusion from rights and responsibilities 
undermines a range of important and legitimate government 
objectives. Their exclusion also runs counter to the principles of 
equality, autonomy, and state neutrality articulated in the report: 
the state ought to support any and all relationships that have the 
capacity to further relevant social goals, and to remain neutral 
with respect to individuals’ choice of a particular form or 
status. 72 
 
(B) THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
If it were up to us, we would urge the LCC to write the report 
differently today. We would tackle the dyadic conception of 
conjugality throughout the development of the report’s 
principles, methodology, and application, although the solutions 
and definitions adopted might not change dramatically. But, it is 
the final chapter of the report on the state’s role in committed 
relationships that would present the biggest challenge. As 
described above, the report was written at a particular political 
moment where public debate about whether the state should 
recognize same-sex marriage was intense. The LCC’s position 
was clearly yes, so long as the state stays in the marriage 
business, it should recognize same-sex marriage even as it 
rethought conjugality as the basis for the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities. Fast forward to 2017, and the legal right to 
a civil same-sex marriage has been a national reality for more 
than a decade. What would a chapter on the state’s role in 
                                                          
72  Ibid at 18. 
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committed relationships look like now, more than a decade after 
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage?  We can of course 
only address what we would do differently, not speculate what 
the LCC (if resurrected) might do differently.  
 
Most obviously, we would not relegate polygamy to a 
footnote. Rather, we would address polygamous and 
polyamorous relationships, and the extent to which the criminal 
law continues to target non-monogamous intimate relationships 
through section 293 of the Criminal Code. In telling the history 
of marriage, we would broaden the narrative to include the 
history of polygamous and monogamous marriage, drawing on 
the materials produced for and cited in the Polygamy 
Reference.73 While the British Columbia Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of section 293 in the Polygamy Reference, 
we do not believe that the ruling is or should be the final word 
on the constitutionality and/or political legitimacy of the 
continued criminalization of polygamy in Canada. 74  In law 
                                                          
73  Polygamy Reference, supra note 31. 
74  There is extensive literature undertaking critical evaluations of the 
criminal prohibition on polygamy and the opinion in the Polygamy 
Reference. See Gillian Calder & Lori G Beaman, eds, oly amy’s 
Rights and Wrongs: Perspectives on Harm, Family, and Law 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013); Jessica P Barnett, Polya ory and 
Criminalization of Plural Conjugal Unions in Canada: Competing 
arrati es in the s. 9  Reference  1  11 1 Se uality Research  
Social Policy  rin owler   ueer riti ue on the Polygamy 
e ate in anada  Law  ulture  and i ersity  1  1 1 al  Leg 
Stud 93. For critiques of the opinion in the Polygamy Reference, see 
argaret eni e  olutionary Psychology  Racial ni us  and the 
Affective Politics of the Polyga y Prohi ition  (2017) 7 Onati Socio-
Legal Series forthco ing  Su anne Lenon  nter ening in the 
Shadow of Claims to White Settler Sovereignty: West Coast LEAF, 
Gender Equality and the Polyga y Reference  (2017) 7 Onati Socio-
Legal Series forthco ing  icheal onn  The Polygamy Reference 
and Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta: Why Are We 
Doing So Poorly in Protecting the Religious Freedoms of Minority 
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report fashion, we would consider the arguments for and against 
the criminal prohibition and the non-recognition of polygamous 
relationships in Canadian law.75 While the federal and provincial 
governments have argued that the protection of women and 
children is a legitimate state objective justifying the 
criminalization of polygamy, we believe that the legislation is 
overbroad and disproportionate. Just as the LCC argued that 
conjugality was a poor proxy for the relational attributes relevant 
to legislative objectives, so we would believe that the criminal 
prohibition of polygamy is a poor proxy for achieving legitimate 
government objectives. The harms that may come to some 
women and children in some polygamous communities could 
and should be addressed through more narrowly targeted 
regulations, many of which currently exist. Sexual assault, 
assault, age of consent, and trafficking laws, to name a few, 
could be deployed against harmful practices when evident, 
rather than using the criminal prohibition against polygamy as a 
proxy for these harms. Moreover, many polygamous and 
polyamorous relationships are not characterized by any of these 
harms, and yet they are caught by the blanket prohibition on 
                                                          
Religious Communities?  1  7 JPPL 263.  
75  See e.g. the papers in Status of Women Canada, Polygamy in Canada: 
Legal and Social Implications for Women and Children: A Collection 
of Policy Research Reports (Ottawa: SWC, November 2005), which 
took a range of positions on the legality of polygamy in Canada. See 
also Martha Bailey & Amy J Kaufman, Polygamy in the Monogamous 
World: Multicultural Challenges for Western Law and Policy (Santa 
Barbara: Praeger, 2010); Susan ru ond  Polyga y’s nscruta le 
ischief  9  7  Osgoode Hall L  17  Angela Campbell, Sister 
Wives, Surrogates and Sex Workers: Outlaws By Choice? (Farnham, 
 shgate 1  enja in L erger  Polyga y and the 
Predica ent of onte orary ri inal Law  in alder  ea an  
supra note 74 at 69. 
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multiple party conjugal relationships in section 293 of the 
Criminal Code.76  
 
Finally, rethinking the dyadic couple conjugal or 
not is not without its conceptual challenges. The rights and 
responsibilities within federal jurisdiction were largely public 
rights and responsibilities. But, how would we think about the 
private rights between the parties? Although within provincial 
jurisdiction, the division of marital property illustrates some of 
the challenges. Consider a polyamorous family with three adults: 
if one party chooses to leave the unit, how would property be 
divided? Provincial division of property regimes are predicted 
on a sharing of the value of assets between two people. If applied 
to the polyamorous family, would the first person to leave be 
entitled to one half? Or one third? Should the value of the 
property of all three adults be calculated, and a presumption of 
equal division be put in place, subject to any revisions agreed to 
by the parties in a domestic contract? What if, as in polygamous 
relationships, the marriage was between one man and multiple 
                                                          
76  The overbreadth of section 293 was limited to some extent by Justice 
au an’s conclusion in the Polygamy Reference that the offence 
re uires ulti le arriages  that in ol ed a sanctioning e ent  
supra note 73 at ara 1 . s he e lained  t he offence is not 
directed at multi-party, unmarried relationships or common law 
cohabitation, but is directed at both polygyny and polyandry. It is also 
directed at multi- arty sa e se  arriages  ibid at para 1037). He 
recognized the absurdity of his conclusion, since parties could avoid 
rosecution y the si le e edient of not undergoing a sanctioning 
e ent  ibid at para 1039). But, absent a constitutional violation, he 
ointed out that it is not the courts’ role to re ise a surd laws  that role 
belongs to Parliament (ibid at para 1040). Whether courts in B.C. and 
other ro inces will follow ustice au an’s inter retation of section 
293 remains to be seen. The ongoing proceedings involving charges of 
engaging in polygamy against Winston Blackmore could provide one 
conte t in which ustice au an’s reference o inion will e 
challenged. See Blackmore v British Columbia, 2016 BCCA 233, 356 
CRR (2d) 239. 
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wives? Would the law consider only the assets held by the 
husband, or by all of the sister wives? These are not 
unanswerable questions, but they do require taking the poly unit 
seriously to consider the appropriate rights and responsibilities.   
 
A not dissimilar scenario would play out in at least a few 
areas of federal jurisdiction. How might Canada Pension Plans 
credits be divided between multiple spouses? Who would be 
entitled to the survivor’s benefit? The report recommended that 
the survivor’s benefit be expanded beyond the spousal and 
conjugal to allow an individual to designate their beneficiary, 
regardless of conjugal or non-conjugal status, provided that they 
were in an economically interdependent relationship. 
Specifically, the report recommended that [c]ontributors in 
non-conjugal relationships should be able to designate the 
persons with whom they live in close personal relationships as 
their beneficiaries for the survivor’s pension. 77  The 
recommendation did not consider multiple spouses. However, 
the Commission did consider the implications of individuals 
having both a separated spouse and a new common law spouse: 
it worried that allowing a designation to the new common law 
spouse could disentitle the former spouse, and suggested that 
some limitations might need to be imposed such that only a 
portion of the benefits could be designated to the new spouse. 
But, imagine instead that the competing spouses are not serial 
but contemporaneous: there are two or more surviving spouses. 
How should the survivor’s benefit be allocated? Equally 
amongst the surviving spouses? Can an individual designate one 
spouse over the others?  
 
Notwithstanding the challenges of working through 
these technical issues, it is clear that the principles that guided 
the LCC’s report, and the methodology it proposed, pointed 
towards the recognition and support of multiple party conjugal 
relationships in a range of contexts. Indeed, once the primary 
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objective of marriage recognition is conceived of as supporting 
committed and caring relationships, it is hard not to see how the 
focus on a conjugal dyad can be preserved. 
 
A rewriting of Beyond Conjugality particularly 
Chapter Four along these terms would result in the rest of the 
report reading somewhat differently. While, as we have just 
argued above, many of the redefinitions of adult personal 
relationships proposed in the report could apply to poly 
relationships, the report did nothing to bring these relationships 
into view. A rewriting of Chapter Three would require that these 
poly relationships be examined as examples of the application of 
the definitions. Our sense is that a consideration of these 
relationships would not actually change the definitions, but 
rather, that these relationships would simply be brought into 
sharper relief.  
 
 Yet, it is important to recognize that although much has 
changed in the intervening years same sex marriage has been 
firmly embedded into Canadian law the central ideas 
contained in the report of moving beyond conjugality remain 
controversial. And despite the increasing visibility of polygamy 
in the Canadian legal context, with multiple law reports, 
constitutional challenges,78 and a proliferation of journal articles 
and books on the topic, 79  polygamy remains extremely 
                                                          
78  Polygamy Reference, supra note 31. 
79  See e.g. aura  Strass erg  he hallenge of Post-Modern 
Polygamy: onsidering Polya ory   1  a ital L Re  9  
Meg Barker & Darren Langdridge, eds, Understanding Non-
Monogamies (New York: Routledge, 2010); Deborah Anapol, 
Polyamory in the 21st Century: Love and Intimacy with Multiple 
Partners (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010); 
Dossie Easton & Janet W Hardy, The Ethical Slut: A Practical Guide 
to Polyamory, Open Relationships and Other Adventures, 2nd ed 
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controversial and divisive with an overwhelming majority of 
popular opinion opposing its recognition.  We recognize that 
rewriting Beyond Conjugality today, with a view to the explicit 
inclusion of poly relationships would still risk breaching a taboo 
topic in Canadian policy debates and public opinion. However, 
the developments in the intervening years have at least made the 
idea of the recognition of poly relationships imaginable, if not 
uncontroversial.  
 
V – CONCLUSION 
 
More than a decade and a half after its publication, the Law 
Commission of Canada’s Beyond Conjugality report remains a 
radical vision for reimagining the legal regulation of intimate 
relationships. Despite the passage of same-sex marriage laws, 
there has been little political appetite for reforming marriage and 
conjugality. Indeed, the move by the Conservative government 
to use marriage as a wedge issue, including the age of marriage, 
marriage fraud, and duress with the Zero Tolerance of Barbaric 
Cultural Practices Act80 in 2015, seemed to backfire, as many 
have speculated that despite its passage, its anti-immigrant 
sentiment contributed to the government’s defeat in the 2015 
election. Even anachronistic marriage and divorce laws, like the 
consummation of marriage requirements, and fault based 
                                                          
Orientation  11) 79:4 U Cin L Rev 1461; Hadar Aviram & 
wendolyn  Leach an  he uture of Polya orous arriage  
Lessons fro  the arriage uality Struggle  1  8  Har  L  
ender 9  ac   Harrison  On arriage and Polyga y  1  
42:1 Ohio NU L Rev 89; Pa lo P re  a arro  eyond nclusion  
Non- onoga ies and the orders of iti enshi  1  1  
Se uality  ulture 1  argaret eni e  hat’s ueer out 
Polyga y  in Ro ert Lec ey  i  roo s  eds  Queer Theory: Law, 
Culture, Empire (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) 137; Zoe Duff, Love 
Alternatively Expressed: The Scoop on Practicing Polyamory in 
Canada (Victoria, BC: Filidh Publishing, 2014). 
80  Supra note 32. 
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divorce laws, remain untouched. Marriage and conjugality seem 
to remain a third rail in Canadian politics, with little to be gained 
by touching them, and much to be lost by doing so.  
 
But, the relevance of the legal regulation of adult 
personal relationships has not diminished. From the increasing 
visibility of poly families to novel relationships produced 
through reproductive technologies, federal, provincial, and 
territorial governments will continue to be called upon to 
response and regulation, and in the absence of proactive 
legislative action, courts will be called upon to adjudicate the 
appropriate recognition of these relationships. We would 
continue to make the claim that we did fifteen years ago²it is 
(still) time to fundamentally rethink the way in which Canadian 
law regulates adult personal relationships.  
